Let sleeping dogs lie
As a side note, it's fascinating how this case has split commentators into two camps, those who think the arrest is warranted (for example, here) and those who think it's not (for example, here). For whatever it's worth, I find it difficult to feel sorry for Mr. Polanski.
Preview of U.S. Supreme Court's new term
Smaller U.S. Supreme Court docket
"Top Small Workplaces" for 2009
Trademarkia
"Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?"
At this writing, the show isn't listed on the WOSU website (click here).
Proposed Ohio gambling plans
For a link to a copy of the the LetOhioVote.org opinion that's referenced in the article, click here. Like the Ohio Grocers Assn. case discussed in previous posts (for example, here), it was a 6-1 decision, with Justice Pfeifer in dissent. The majority held that the video-lottery-terminal ("VLT") provisions in the state's 2010-2011 biennial budget are subject to referendum under the Ohio Constitution. Under the Ohio Constitution, certain matters are not subject to referendum (click here), but the majority held that these exceptions did not apply to the VLT provisions at issue.
In dissent, Justice Pfeifer wrote, "[t]his case is truly one of first impression. Here, for the first time, this court is analyzing the state's biennial budget bill for the purpose of determining citizens' right to seek referendum." (¶57). He also wrote, "the exceptions . . . allow the legislature to budget without the uncertainty that referendum brings to the legislative process. Free from the threat of referendum, obligations and the means to fulfill those obligations are preserved with predictability. The exemption from referendum allows the state to make good on its liabilities; without it, the budget could remain in limbo for over a year, leaving the state unable to pay its 'current expenses.' " (¶62).
The Dispatch article states that the decision "potentially creates a hole of nearly $1 billion" in the state budget, and that Governor Strickland is "considering his options."
What the practice of law might look like in the future
Hat tip to Ernest Svenson.
Renting a CFO
Lawsuit seeks to increase the number of members in the U.S. House of Representatives
Initial thoughts on Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Levin, Ohio Tax Commr.
In contrast, the dissent (Pfeifer, J.) states, "[t]his court in answering the question before us is burdened by a questionable legal principle, which requires us to presume that any statute enacted by the General Assembly is constitutional. This court has not seriously looked at this presumption in decades. The presumption has taken on a life of its own apart from whatever merits ever precipitated its institution." (¶69). The dissent also states, "[g]iven the obvious supremacy of the Constitution, a better rule of construction would be to resolve all doubts in favor of the applicability of the Constitution." (¶75).
My own conclusion is that the constitutional language at issue was open to more than one interpretation and simply wasn't clear, as applied to the CAT. In such cases, courts will sometimes employ rules of construction, to "break the tie." In this case, in the Court's majority opinion, the rule that statutes are presumed to be constitutional tilted the balance toward holding that the CAT is constitutional. The dissent raises an important question, however, as to whether that presumption still makes sense.
Good suggestion for Rule 26(f) conferences
Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Levin, Ohio Tax Commr. (update)
The scope of corporate rights
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.
The Native Americans argue in the petition that the marks, which the team registered between 1967 and 1990, "should never have been registered and . . . were therefore void ab initio, justifying immediate cancellation. Section 14(3) of the [Lanham] Act provides for cancellation of a registration 'at any time,' if the subject mark was registered 'contrary to the provisions' of Section 2(a) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). Pursuant to Section 2(a), no mark shall be registered if it consists of or comprises 'matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, . . . or bring them into contempt, or disrepute . . . .' 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)." (Petition at p. 3).
The Native Americans prevailed at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in 1999, but the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia reversed on the basis of laches, and, after a remand, the D.C. Circuit affirmed. The D.C. Circuit's opinion states, laches is "an equitable defense that applies where there is '(1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.'"
In the petition, the Native Americans assert that there is a split among circuits on the question of whether laches applies to trademark cancellation petitions. (Petition at 8). The petition cites a Third Circuit opinion that then-Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Alito wrote in which, according to the petitioners, the court "held that a counterclaim brought under Section 14(3) of the Act was not time-barred" by the doctrine of laches because of the statute's use of the words "at any time." (Id.) Not surprisingly, the cert petition relies heavily on that opinion.
For the most part, I grew up in the Washington, D.C. area, and I've been a fan of the team for a long time, but it's tough for me to see how the term "redskins" isn't disparaging. Whether a court will ever reach that question, however, remains to be seen.
Control and flexibility correspond to job satisfaction
Judicial elections
What not to do with a law blog (part 2)
What not to do with a law blog
September 11
That day made no sense. It doesn't make any more sense to me now.
Liquidated damages provisions
A liquidated damages provision is “[a] contractual provision that determines in advance the measure of damages if a party breaches the agreement.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), at 949-950. It might, for example, specify that the breaching party will pay to the nonbreaching party a fixed dollar amount in the event of a default. Or, it might take the form of a monetary cap on the breaching party’s damages.
A liquidated damages provision (which is also sometimes referred to as a stipulated damages provision) is appropriate when the non-breaching party’s actual damages would be difficult to estimate at the time of contracting. If the provision acts as a penalty, however, it will be unenforceable on public policy grounds, “[b]ecause the sole purpose of contract damages is to compensate the nonbreaching party for losses suffered as a result of the breach[.]” Lake Ridge Academy v. Carney (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 376, 381, 613 N.E.2d 183. “Thus, when a stipulated damages provision is challenged, the court must step back and examine it in light of what the parties knew at the time the contract was formed and in light of an estimate of the actual damages caused by the breach. If the provision was reasonable at the time of formation and it bears a reasonable (not necessarily exact) relation to actual damages, the provision will be enforced.” 66 Ohio St.3d at 382. In Ohio, a liquidated damages provision will be upheld if it meets the following test:
Where the parties have agreed on the amount of damages, ascertained by estimation and adjustment, and have expressed this agreement in clear and unambiguous terms, the amount so fixed should be treated as liquidated damages and not as a penalty, if the damages would be (1) uncertain as to amount and difficult of proof, and if (2) the contract as a whole is not so manifestly unconscionable, unreasonable, and disproportionate in amount as to justify the conclusion that it does not express the true intention of the parties, and if (3) the contract is consistent with the conclusion that it was the intention of the parties that damages in the amount stated should follow the breach thereof.
Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.
(1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 27, 465 N.E.2d 392 (syllabus)
(holding that $50 cap on liability in burglar alarm
contract was unenforceable); see also Midamco,
L.P. v. Fashion Bug of Solon, Inc. (1996), 116
Ohio App.3d 854, 857-858, 689 N.E.2d 605 (collecting
cases in which liquidated damages provisions were
held unenforceable).
The party that seeks to benefit from a liquidated
damages provision should obviously avoid using the
term “penalty” to describe the damages. See,
e.g., Wright v. Bassinger, Mahoning
App. No. 01CA81, 2003-Ohio-2377 (holding that a
liquidated damages provision that specified a five
percent “penalty” was unenforceable). That party
should also be able to demonstrate that the parties
arrived at the method of calculating the amount of
the specified damages in a reasonable manner.
Id. at ¶20. It may also make sense to
provide affirmatively in the contract (to the extent
that circumstances permit) that actual damages would
be uncertain as to amount and difficult of proof,
that each party understands the liquidated damages
provision and has had access to counsel in connection
with reviewing and negotiating the terms of the
contract, that the provision is the result of arm’s
length negotiations, that the specified damages are
“proportionate in amount compared to the value of
services under” the contract (Republic Services
of Ohio Hauling, L.L.C. v. Pepper Pike Properties,
Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 81525, 2003-Ohio-1348,
at ¶41) and “proportional to the anticipated ‘harm’
from the ‘breach’ of the contract” (Westbrock v.
W. Ohio Health Care Corp. (2000), 137 Ohio
App.3d 304, 323, 738 N.E.2d 799), that the parties
intend “to provide for liquidated damages in the
specified amount” (Young v. Int’l Bhd. of
Locomotive Engineers (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d
499, 509, 683 N.E.2d 420), and that the parties
intend the damages to serve merely as compensation,
and not as a penalty.
Bill Walsh's philosophy of leadership
New cyberlaw blog
When enforcing contract rights creates a public relations nightmare
Update: click here.